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MIRANDA, PLEASE REPORT TO THE 
PRINCIPAL’S OFFICE 
Meg Penrose∗
[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults 
alone.
 
1
The age of an alleged criminal offender undoubtedly affects his or her 
ability to appreciate the consequences of confessing to criminal behavior.  
Courts have long accepted that youth and inexperience impact an 
individual’s ability to make a voluntary confession.
 
2  Accordingly, this 
Article addresses whether Miranda v. Arizona—the seminal Fifth 
Amendment decision providing procedural rights to those enduring 
custodial interrogation3—should apply to students interrogated by school 
officials during school hours.4  To answer this difficult question, this 
Article first provides a brief overview of the law of minors and confessions.  
Next, it considers the increasing law enforcement presence on our school 
campuses and evaluates how this presence affects the role of school 
officials.  Finally, the high level of cooperation between law enforcement 
and school officials in criminal law enforcement are considered to 
determine whether Miranda should apply in the principal’s office.5
A. MIRANDA’S APPLICABILITY TO JUVENILES 
 
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or 
 
∗ J.D., Pepperdine School of Law; Managing Editor, Pepperdine Law Review; LL.M., Notre 
Dame Law School.  My experiences as a consultant to the United States Department of 
Justice (USDOJ) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children on school safety issues served as the impetus for 
this article.  I would like to thank my research assistant John Rogers, my colleague Bernie 
James, and my dear friend Vivian Houng for their guidance and advice on the piece.  As the 
author, however, any errors are attributable to me alone.  
 1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). 
 2. See id. at 14. 
 3. 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966). 
 4. Id. 
 5. While due process considerations remain important in any confession or 
interrogation analysis, this article will maintain a narrow focus on the application of 
Miranda to questioning by school officials in schools. 
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inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant 
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure 
the privilege against self-incrimination.  By custodial interrogation, we 
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has 
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any 
significant way.6
On at least five occasions, the United States Supreme Court has 
considered cases involving minors and confessions.
 
7  The Court’s 
jurisprudence can be easily categorized into two main areas: cases 
involving Due Process or voluntariness challenges to confessions, and 
cases addressing purported Miranda violations in obtaining confessions.  In 
both contexts, however, the Court has clearly indicated that there exists a 
distinction between minors and their adult counterparts in evaluating 
whether the confession should be utilized in criminal proceedings.  As the 
Court emphasized in Gault, “admissions and confessions of juveniles 
require special caution.”8
 
 6. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
 
 7. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004) (holding in a five-four plurality 
decision that the Miranda custody inquiry relies on an objective test); Fare v. Michael C., 
442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979) (assessing, under the “totality of the circumstances” test, whether 
sixteen-year-old juvenile waived his Miranda rights); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) 
(concluding that “the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the 
case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults”); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 
(1962) (prohibiting use, under “totality of the circumstances” test, of confession obtained 
from fourteen-year-old boy who was held by police for five days without access to his 
mother or other adult advisor); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (precluding, on 
Due Process grounds, admission of confession garnered through holding fifteen-year-old 
boy incommunicado for more than three days, during which time his lawyer twice tried to 
gain access to him). 
  The Court’s most recent pronouncement in Alvarado evaluated the Miranda custody 
question through the very limited prism of federal habeas corpus review.  Alvarado, 541 
U.S. at 655.  Because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act severely delimits 
federal review of state habeas claims, the Court did not consider the custody question 
squarely and without constraint.  Id. at 665.  Rather, much of the opinion focuses on the 
narrow question of whether the lower courts unreasonably applied federal law.  Id. at 666-
69.  The important component of Alvarado, however, remains Justice O’Connor’s one-
paragraph concurring opinion.  Id. at 669.  Although four Justices found that while the youth 
of an individual may be relevant to the Due Process voluntariness issue, they were unwilling 
to hold that age, standing alone, affects the Miranda custody issue. Id. at 666-68.  Justice 
O’Connor’s brief concurrence left open the possibility that “[t]here may be cases in which a 
suspect’s age will be relevant to the Miranda ‘custody’ inquiry.”  Id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  Justice O’Connor’s hesitation regarding the consideration of age and its effect 
on custody inquiries prevented Alvarado from becoming binding authority on lower courts.  
Id.  As her opinion reveals, Justice O’Connor’s reticence to incorporate age as a variable in 
the Miranda custody issue in this particular case was due to the fact that Alvarado was 
nearly eighteen years old at the time of the interview.  Id. 
 8. Gault, 387 U.S. at 45. 
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Lowers courts, also, have distinguished between youthful offenders and 
their more senior peers.9  These same courts, however, have increasingly 
been willing to broach the germane issue of who should be evaluated when 
assessing the voluntariness and admissibility of a minor’s confession.10
Lower courts have addressed this sensitive and synergistic relationship 
in the New Jersey v. T.L.O. search and seizure context,
  
Under Miranda and its progeny, the consideration has been strictly limited 
to law enforcement officers —usually police officers.  But, with the 
increased police presence in both public and private schools, courts must 
now address the relationship between school resource officers (SROs) 
(those police officers that are regularly scheduled to work at schools in 
both a school disciplinary and law enforcement capacity) and the teachers 
and principals who work in conjunction with SROs to maintain safety, 
order, and discipline on campuses. 
11 but have not been 
as forthcoming in the confession arena where students need greater 
protection.12  Just two years ago, Justice Breyer resurrected the concept of 
in loco parentis as it relates to the intersection of school discipline and 
school law enforcement.13  Generally, the transition in modern times has 
been to move away from the more liberal approach taken in Tinker v. Des 
Moines14 and toward an increasingly restrictive notion of students’ rights in 
the overlapping criminal law and school discipline context.15  Students may 
retain their Fourth Amendment rights, though somewhat diluted, but their 
Fifth Amendment rights more readily fall victim to the dual capacity of 
school official as part teacher, part state actor.16
 
 9. In re Andre M., 88 P.3d 552, 555–56 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc) (reversing the lower 
court’s opinion that a sixteen-and-a-half-year-old’s confession was voluntary because his 
mother was barred from the interrogation that occurred on school premises). 
  While courts recognize 
 10. In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 2002) (finding juvenile should have received 
Miranda warnings prior to questioning by SRO at school); In re G.S.P., 610 N.W.2d 651, 
658 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (finding twelve-year-old “in custody” where principal informed 
student he must answer questions proffered by police officer). 
 11. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 12. Miranda specifically noted that modern confession protections are geared toward 
psychological manipulation rather than physically oriented violations.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
448.  Observing the shortcomings of confession tactics, the Court observed, “[i]nterrogation 
still takes place in privacy.  Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our 
knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.”  Id. 
 13. Bd. of Educ. of I.S.D. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 840 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 14. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 15. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (finding that 
random urine testing on students participating in extracurricular athletics does not offend the 
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures). 
 16. Commonwealth v. Ira I., 791 N.E.2d 894, 900–901 (Mass. 2003) (stating that school 
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that school teachers and principals are cloaked with power as state actors in 
the Fourth Amendment scenario, their power as state actors in the Fifth 
Amendment context is murky, at best.  Coupled with this fickle state actor 
role status is the dilemma that SROs continue to work in conjunction with 
school officials to question students for law enforcement purposes—not 
simply for school discipline purposes.17
At this juncture our modern precedent proves increasingly deficient.  
School officials who question children in a custodial fashion, having pulled 
the child out of classes where they must otherwise be present, should not be 
able to shed their state actor status in order to extract a confession that will 
be used by law enforcement officers for criminal prosecution.
 
18  While 
school officials should remain entitled to question students for school 
disciplinary purposes, these disciplinary purposes frequently become 
subterfuges, if not pretext, for the quick referral of minors to the local 
police department and criminal prosecution.19
Courts should take greater care in distinguishing the role of educators 
and SROs who engage in questioning of juveniles at schools.  While school 
“custody” may differ from police station custody, courts must begin 
addressing whether school principal and SRO questioning is the functional 
equivalent of “custodial interrogation.”
 
20
 
officials acting within their capacity as educators and not as instruments of the police are not 
required to provide Miranda warnings) (citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 
1369 (Mass. 1992)). 
  Let us now assess the nature of 
the relationship between school officials and their minor charges.  If in loco 
parentis permits stricter discipline and more invasive searches, then courts 
should apply this same stringency to the questioning of minors and delimit 
the collaboration allowed between school officials and law enforcement 
when the confession of a minor is at issue.  Either school officials are state 
actors for Constitutional purposes or they are not.  If courts permit school 
officials and law enforcement to have it both ways, whereby principals may 
 17. In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 332-33 (Pa. 2002); In re R.J.E., 630 N.W.2d 457, 459 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 642 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 2002); In re G.S.P., 
610 N.W.2d 651, 653-54 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 18. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (summarizing the Court’s holding as follows: “when an 
individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in 
any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination 
is jeopardized”) (emphasis added).  While Miranda’s “in custody” assessment generally 
uses more restrictive language focusing squarely on police officers, this more broad 
language provides ample guidance for other authorities that also assist law enforcement with 
custodial interrogation. 
 19. See, e.g., In re Angel S., 758 N.Y.S.2d 606, 607 (App. Div. 2003) (student 
questioned by principal in presence of fire marshals). 
 20. See In re D.J.B., No. C3-02-731, 2003 WL 175546, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 
2003) (unpublished opinion). 
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search as state actors yet question criminal suspects without being 
considered state actors, then the final vestiges of Tinker’s promise that 
students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate has 
vanished.21
B. THE STATUS OF THE LAW: APPLICATION OF THE TOTALITY OF 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is 
available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect 
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any 
significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.22
In many, if not most cases, courts have been reluctant to view school 
officials—even those individuals employed at schools as SROs—as state 
actors falling within the ambit of Miranda.  Rather than considering the 
inherently coercive and custodial nature of the school setting, courts 
frequently focus only on whether a reasonable student would feel he or she 
was free to exit the interview.
 
23  It is naïve to assume that an individual 
pulled involuntarily out of class would feel capable of exercising the right 
simply to return from where he or she was removed.  This dogmatic 
application, while consistent with the literal Miranda “custody” 
requirement,24
A relevant, oft-cited opinion, is In re Killitz.
 turns a blind eye to the reality that most students do not 
recognize, much less exert, an ability to rebuff the school official’s 
inquisitorial advances.  Thus, courts continue to take a constrained view of 
Miranda’s applicability in schools by assessing, under the totality of the 
circumstances, whether a particular juvenile believed he or she was “in 
custody” while being questioned by school officials. 
25
 
 21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.  (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”) 
(emphasis added).  Courts and commentators, however, continually omit the specific First 
Amendment references from the renowned quote and simply reference Tinker as a shorthand 
citation for the protection of students’ Constitutional rights at school.  See, e.g., Earls, 536 
U.S. at 829; Acton, 515 U.S. at 655-56; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985). 
  Decided in 1982, this 
opinion considered whether a junior high student’s incriminating 
 22. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
 23. Cf. In re Drolshagen, 310 S.E.2d 927, 927 (S.C. 1984) (finding there was no custody 
because the student voluntarily reported to the principal’s office, even though the 
appearance was at the request of the investigating police officer). 
 24. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (“Miranda warnings are required 
only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him in 
custody.”). 
 25. 651 P.2d 1382 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). 
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statements made to a police officer during a school interview violated 
Miranda.26  At issue was whether the juvenile defendant had committed an 
off-campus burglary.27  The principal summoned the student during school 
hours to the principal’s office where an armed, uniformed police officer 
interviewed the student in the presence of the school principal.28  Neither 
the school principal nor the officer informed the juvenile defendant that he 
was free to leave or disregard their questions.29  Indeed, in finding that the 
juvenile was subjected to a custodial interrogation invoking the Miranda 
protections, the court emphasized that the defendant “was in school during 
regular hours, where his movements were controlled to a great extent by 
school personnel.”30  Further, that “defendant cannot be said to have come 
voluntarily to the place of questioning” because he would likely have been 
subjected to disciplinary actions had he refused the principal’s command to 
come to his office.31  Based upon all these factors, the court found that the 
juvenile had been subjected to a custodial interrogation, precluding the 
admission of his incriminating statements in subsequent criminal 
proceedings.32
Another significant opinion is In re G.S.P., from the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals.
 
33  G.S.P., a twelve-year-old, was accused of bringing a gun to 
school when his backpack was left behind in the locker room after a 
football game.34  The following morning, G.S.P. was removed from class 
by the assistant principal and the uniformed school liaison officer, Officer 
Johnson.35  When G.S.P. asked why he was being taken out of class, the 
assistant principal said he would explain when they were in his office.36
 
 26. Id. at 1383 (setting forth the issue in the case as “invol[ving] the admissibility of 
incriminating statements made by a junior high school student while being questioned in the 
principal’s office by a police officer”). 
  
Once in the office, the assistant principal informed G.S.P. that he “had no 
choice but to answer the questions,” and Officer Johnson informed G.S.P. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1383-84 (observing that “[n]either the police officer nor the principal said or 
did anything to dispel the clear impression communicated to the defendant that he was not 
free to leave”). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1384. 
 32. Id.  In reaching its decision, the court also considered that the juvenile had been 
questioned as a suspect not merely as a witness.  Id. at 1383.  However, this consideration 
has not been uniform in school decisions and was not likely decisive. 
 33. 610 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 34. Id. at 653. 
 35. Id. at 653-54. 
 36. Id. at 654. 
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that a tape recorder would be on.37  The principal began by stating he was 
going to ask a few questions and then “turn it over to Officer Johnson.”38
In finding the interview tantamount to a custodial interrogation the court 
emphasized that “where, as here, a uniformed officer summons a juvenile 
from the classroom to the office and actively participates in the 
questioning, the circumstances suggest the coercive influence associated 
with a formal arrest.”
 
39  Further, the court noted “[t]he record reveals that 
G.S.P. was questioned for potential criminal conduct, not just for 
misbehavior at school.  The questions were reasonably likely to elicit a 
criminally incriminating response.”40  Thus, while noting that there is 
nothing wrong with police officers participating in the investigation of 
school disciplinary issues, where the focus of questioning is to elicit 
criminally incriminating information from a suspect, the protections of the 
Fifth Amendment must be fully afforded.41
The crucial fact in G.S.P. was that the court found the school official to 
be working in concert with the police officer.  The court believed that the 
interchange between the assistant principal, G.S.P., and Officer Johnson 
constituted a single episode rather than two distinct interviews.
 
42  Like the 
Oregon decision in Killitz, the Minnesota G.S.P. court held that “a Miranda 
warning must be given by all that use the power of the state to elicit 
criminally incriminating responses.”43
Two state supreme courts have dealt directly with this issue.
 
44  In 2002, 
in In re R.H., the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether 
SROs should be considered “law enforcement officers” within the purview 
of Miranda, where the SRO conducted a twenty-five minute school 
interview of a juvenile vandalism suspect.45  The defendant was removed 
from class during school hours by the SRO.46  During the interview, the 
SRO asked defendant to remove his shoe to compare it to footprints left in 
the vandalized classroom, and then informed the juvenile defendant that he 
was keeping the shoe for evidence.47
 
 37. Id. 
  Not until the juvenile admitted his 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 658. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 659. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 333-34 (Pa. 2002); In re Andre M., 88 P.3d 552 (Ariz. 
2004). 
 45. In re R.H., 791 A.2d at  334. 
 46. Id. at 332. 
 47. Id. 
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involvement were his mother and the municipal police department 
contacted.48
Finding that the juvenile student was entitled to receive Miranda 
warnings under the circumstances presented, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court reversed the juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency.
 
49  In a fractured 
opinion with two dissenting and two concurring opinions, the majority of 
the court agreed that because the interrogating school police officers were 
wearing uniforms and badges, and because “the interrogation ultimately led 
to charges by the municipal police, not punishment by school officials 
pursuant to school rules,” the SROs were deemed to be law enforcement 
officers subject to the strictures of Miranda.50
The most persuasive opinion in In re R.H., however, was authored by 
Justice Newman, who wrote that courts should extend T.L.O. “to the Fifth 
Amendment context and hold that the school officials should give the 
student Miranda warnings when the constitutional interests of the student 
outweigh the interest of the school in solving the crime.”
 
51
When weighing the constitutional interests of the student in this setting, 
courts should consider the following factors: (1) the age of the student to 
be questioned (the older the student is, the more likely the information 
elicited from him in an interrogation will be used against him in a court of 
law, rendering Miranda warnings more necessary); (2) the ability of the 
juvenile to understand the Miranda warnings, if they are given; (3) the 
gravity of the offense alleged (likewise, the more serious the offense the 
school officials are investigating, the more likely that he will be 
criminally charged); (4) the prospect of criminal proceedings, as opposed 
to merely school-related discipline; and (5) the extent of the coercive 
environment in which the questioning occurs.
  In addition, 
Justice Newman announced a laudable test for determining whether 
juvenile interviews are custodial when occurring on school campuses: 
52
As Justice Newman noted, “recognizing that the school setting is sui 
generis, the school officials can demonstrate that the warnings are not 
necessary if, after balancing the factors articulated above, it was reasonable 
for them not to Mirandize the student.”
 
53
 
 48. Id. 
  Justice Newman’s balancing test 
provides school officials with the necessary and time-honored latitude in 
dealing with disciplinary issues that are truly school-related.  Where, 
 49. Id. at 333–34. 
 50. Id. at 334. 
 51. Id. at 348 (Newman, J., concurring). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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however, the focus of the inquiry is more criminally-related, the Newman 
variables provide school officials with notice that Miranda is applicable 
and, accordingly, should be respected.  Without painting a bright line, 
Justice Newman tactfully strikes the balance between the needs and 
protections afforded school officials under T.L.O., and the increasingly 
active law enforcement role that school officials are voluntarily assuming 
in modern society.  Under this view, it appears the traditional Miranda 
“totality of the circumstances” test may be inappropriate for use in school 
cases.  
The only other state supreme court to consider the issue of schoolhouse 
confessions is Arizona, in In re Andre M., an en banc opinion.54  Although 
this case did not involve Miranda directly, the court did consider the 
repercussions of excluding a parent from a school interview where the 
parent has asked to be present during the questioning.55  A sixteen-and-a-
half-year-old juvenile was sent to his high school principal’s office to be 
questioned about his suspected involvement in a fist fight.56  The school 
initially contacted the juvenile’s mother, who awaited further questioning 
of her son by the police.57  Thereafter, the juvenile’s mother left the room, 
having been assured that her son would not be questioned by the police 
unless she was present or a school principal was designated to sit in for 
her.58  Despite these assurances, the juvenile was questioned by three 
police officers and the mother was prevented entry into the interview by 
another police officer, who was sitting outside the interview room.59
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Arizona Supreme 
Court found that the juvenile In re Andre M. had not voluntarily confessed 
to the police, yet refused to adopt the juvenile’s invitation “to hold that if 
the police deliberately exclude a parent from his or her child’s 
interrogation, without good cause to do so, any resulting statement must be 
suppressed.”
 
60  The court did, however, place great emphasis on the fact 
that the juvenile’s mother was intentionally excluded from the schoolhouse 
questioning.61
 
 54. In re Andre M., 88 P.3d 552, 555 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc). 
  While this decision may have little relevance to the more 
 55. Id. at 553 (wherein the court “granted review to consider the standard for 
determining the voluntariness of a juvenile’s confession when a parent has been denied 
access to her child’s interrogation”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 553-54. 
 59. Id. at 554. 
 60. Id. at 555. 
 61. Id. at 556.  While the court recognized “that circumstances may justify, or even 
require, the exclusion of a parent” in certain cases, this case was not deemed to be one of 
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discrete Miranda analysis, the case is important because it found that the 
failures to “Mirandize” a student and to include a parent in an on-campus 
police interview resulted in the suppression of an involuntary confession.  
As previously discussed, confessions can be excluded from evidence either 
under Miranda or Due Process voluntariness grounds.  In re Andre M. 
provides important guidance, because courts will continually grapple with 
the issue of student confessions. 
Beyond the obvious factors of police/school entanglement, courts 
scrutinize school interviews and assess custody by considering: (1) the age 
of juvenile; (2) whether the law enforcement figure is in uniform, armed, 
and participating in the interview; and (3) whether the juvenile was 
informed that he or she had the right to leave the interview because they 
were not under arrest.62  Curiously, however, courts do not seem concerned 
about the broad latitude given to school officials to question students on 
non-school offenses such as burglaries, sexual assaults or other off-campus 
behaviors.  Courts should vigilantly assess whether school officials are 
working in concert with law enforcement and thereby abandoning their in 
loco parentis role.  Likewise, courts should evaluate whether the school 
official is tending to or inquiring about matters related to the safety, order, 
and discipline of campus, not merely the business of students and their off-
campus lives.  Abandoning the narrow focus of custody and opting for a 
more scrutinizing assessment of why a particular juvenile is being 
interviewed on campus by school officials should preclude school officials 
and SROs from immunizing their pseudo-law enforcement activities under 
the guise of T.L.O. and its progeny.63
Where the behavior is school related and deals strictly with disciplinary 
issues, the Fifth Amendment poses no obstacle to school officials 
furthering the safety and order of their charges.  Unfortunately, the current 
state of affairs often involves school officials with non-school-related 
offenses and asks them to “assist” in interviewing potential criminal 
 
 
them.  As the court explained: 
When, however, the state fails to establish good cause for barring a parent from a 
juvenile’s interrogation, a strong inference arises that the state excluded the parent 
in order to maintain a coercive atmosphere or to discourage the juvenile from fully 
understanding and exercising his constitutional rights. 
 Id. at 555-556 (citations omitted). 
 62. In re Welfare of R.J.E., 630 N.W.2d 457, 460-61 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).  
 63. But see Jefferson v. State, 449 So. 2d 1280 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).  No problem is 
presented where a student voluntarily presents him or herself at the principal’s office for 
purposes of confession to criminal behavior.  Id. at 1281 (finding student voluntarily 
reported to the principal’s office thereby negating any need for Miranda warnings).  The 
focus of this article is the compulsory activity of school officials in requiring a student to 
report to the principal’s office for purposes of an interview. 
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suspects.  Where the purpose of the interview, even remotely, is to elicit 
evidence intended for use in criminal proceedings, the dynamic of the 
exchange transforms immediately into a setting where the Fifth 
Amendment and its full protections should be afforded and honored.  It is 
this latter scenario where a silver platter doctrine equivalent should be 
applied to prevent school officials from unjustly stripping juveniles of their 
constitutionally guaranteed rights.64
C. INCORPORATING THE SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE INTO AN 
INCREASINGLY POLICE-LIKE SETTING 
  Schools should limit themselves and 
their investigations to school-related disciplinary issues.  Nothing in T.L.O., 
Acton, or Earls hinted that they enjoy any greater powers. 
To maintain a “fair state-individual balance,” to require the government 
“to shoulder the entire load,” to respect the inviolability of the human 
personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the 
government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against 
him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple 
expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.65
The majority of cases assessing Miranda’s viability on school campuses 
bypass the important question of whether school officials are working in 
concert with police officers to effectuate criminal prosecutions of juveniles.  
The assumption is that school officials are not working, either tacitly or 
patently, as agents of the police.  However, unlike the scenarios presented 
in T.L.O. and Acton, many modern cases illustrate that school officials do 
work in tandem with police to ensure that juveniles not only receive school 
penalties for misbehavior, but also face criminal prosecution for violating 
state criminal codes.
 
66
Supreme Court precedent supports “the conclusion that questioning by 
any government employee comes within Miranda whenever ‘prosecution 
of the defendant being questioned is among the purposes, definite or 
contingent, for which the information is elicited.’”
  While juveniles should not escape criminal 
prosecution for criminal behavior, the mandates of criminal procedure 
should fully extend to juveniles who are interrogated by the same 
individuals likely to participate in their subsequent criminal prosecution.  
For better or worse, school officials are increasingly becoming active 
participants in the criminal process. 
67
 
 64. See generally Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
 In this holding, 
 65. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). 
 66. See discussion supra, Part B. 
 67. See State v. Heritage, 61 P.3d 1190, 1194 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
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Washington’s Court of Appeals quoted Professor Wayne LaFave, who 
wrote that the “definite or contingent” purpose for which information is 
elicited “will often be manifested by the fact that the questioner’s duties 
include the investigation or reporting of crimes.”68
In recent years, schools have been legislatively required or have 
voluntarily consented to participate in programs requiring the reporting of 
any behavior that, while possibly violating a school rule, qualifies as a 
criminal offense.
 
69  Schools now routinely collaborate with police officers 
when a student is found to have drugs, drug paraphernalia, or weapons and 
offenses which clearly violate both school regulations and criminal law.70  
Schools also assist the police in investigating allegations relating to assaults 
(fighting)71 and sexual assaults (incest or rape),72
Frequently, local school districts employ police officers with dual 
assignments as both teacher and law enforcement officer.
 the majority of which 
occur off-campus.  It is in these latter instances, particularly, that school 
involvement cannot encompass anything other than pseudo-police 
behavior.  Non-school events that have predominantly, if not exclusively, 
non-school effects should disqualify school officials from working in 
concert with police officers without invoking traditional criminal procedure 
protections. 
73
 
 68. Id.  (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET. AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.10 (c), at 624 (2d 
ed. 1999)). 
  Courts should 
not readily dismiss the police qualities these individuals possess and 
express while working on school campuses.  Rather, courts should accept 
that these individuals possess the full arsenal of police powers: search, 
 69. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 4112(b)(1) (2001). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Commonwealth v. Ira I., 791 N.E.2d 894, 897 (Mass. 2003) (assault and battery of 
fellow juvenile student off-campus). 
 72. There are many excellent examples of cases where sexual assaults occurred off-
campus but were investigated by school officials and police officers in an on-campus 
interview.  See In re J.A.S., No. A04-521, 2005 WL 44455 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005) 
(unpublished opinion); In re D.J.B., No. C3-02-731, 2003 WL 175546 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 
17, 2003) (unpublished opinion) (court held statements regarding off campus sexual assault 
must be suppressed because juvenile deemed to be in custody where SRO interviewed 
juvenile in a conference room at juvenile’s school); State v. R.B., No. 41618-9-I, 1998 WL 
729678 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1998) (unpublished opinion) (court found no custodial 
interrogation where seventeen-year-old was interviewed for six or seven minutes by a police 
detective at school despite fact that alleged rape took place off-campus); State v. Doe, 948 
P.2d 166, 168 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997) (SRO requested ten-year-old juvenile be removed from 
class where he was interviewed by the SRO about an alleged sexual assault that had 
occurred off campus, and the court held that his statements during this interview must be 
suppressed under Miranda.). 
 73. See National Association School Resource Officers,  
http://www.nasro.org/about_nasro.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
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seizure, arrest, and, most notably, interrogation.  It is time that our 
jurisprudence reflect the growing reality that school officials, not just 
school resource officers, are taking on a greater and more active role in 
their communities’ efforts to eradicate juvenile crime. 
While the era of T.L.O. proved vital in making schools safe for learning 
purposes by empowering school officials with the ability to perform 
searches under the less stringent reasonable suspicion standard, the modern 
decisions of Acton74 and Earls75 reflect a concern that juvenile crime can 
best be quelled with the proactive assistance of school officials.76  Yet, 
both Acton and Earls are remarkable in that each decision ratified the 
suspicionless urine searches at issue because the results were not turned 
over to law enforcement.77  Instead, students testing positive for drug use in 
each instance were required to submit to non-criminal sanctions—a fact 
that should not go unnoticed.78  As school officials and SROs take more 
initiative in eradicating crime on campuses, courts should recognize the 
limited reach of T.L.O., Acton, and Earls.79
School safety can remain a paramount concern without resulting in 
simultaneous criminal prosecutions.  If school safety is the true concern, 
something that is debatable at this point, then police involvement is not 
relevant because the sanctions should be limited to those required to keep 
students and school officials safe.  But as school officials and SROs 
continue to take a more active role in working with police officers to 
provide police with information gleaned from schoolhouse interviews, 
courts should evaluate whether the “prosecution of the [student] being 
questioned is among the purposes, definite or contingent, for which the 
information is elicited.”
 
80
D. THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL QUESTIONING 
 
Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on 
information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with the 
authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut 
 
 74. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-66 (1995). 
 75. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S 
822 (2002). 
 76. See generally Meg Penrose, Shedding Rights, Shredding Rights: A Critical 
Examination of Students’ Privacy Rights and the “Special Needs” Doctrine After Earls, 3 
NEV. L.J. 411 (2002-03). 
 77. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833; Acton, 515 U.S. at 658. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Penrose, supra note 69, at 433. 
 80. Washington v. Heritage, 61 P.3d 1190, 1194 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis 
added) (citing United States v. D.F., 63 F.3d 671, 683 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
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fact.81
Chief Justice Warren summarized the decision in Miranda as holding 
that, “when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to 
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.”
 
82  It is 
time to assess precisely what Justice Warren intended when he used the 
more amorphous language “by the authorities” in summarizing this 
landmark decision.  The case was not likely intended to apply solely to law 
enforcement officers in the most narrow, traditional sense.  We know this 
to be true through application of precedent extending Miranda’s 
protections to non-police scenarios such as Mathis v. United States83 and 
Estelle v. Smith.84  State courts have also mandated Miranda warnings 
when park security officers questioned juveniles regarding drug use85 and 
where police interviewed a juvenile at a children’s shelter.86
Courts must begin considering the heritage of this great opinion and 
evaluate whether present day school officials are more akin to law 
enforcement officers maintaining a custodial power over students’ 
movements or sufficiently distinguishable because school officials lack the 
actual power of arrest.  Courts likewise should assess whether school 
officials are working in tandem with police officers to transcend the 
traditional safety, order, and discipline environment of schoolhouses into 
the more accusatorial environment of police stations.  If, as it appears, the 
  Thus, 
extension of Miranda outside the narrow arena of police station 
questioning is neither revolutionary nor inconsistent with past decisions. 
 
 81. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468–69. 
 82. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (emphasis added). 
 83. 391 U.S. 1, 5 (1968) (finding Internal Revenue Service (IRS) civil investigator who 
questioned defendant while the defendant was in jail custody on another matter was required 
to provide defendant Miranda warnings for matters relating to the IRS investigation). 
 84. 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding Miranda applicable to psychiatric examination 
performed on defendant). 
 85. See Heritage, 61 P.3d at 1194-95 (relying heavily upon Mathis and Estelle to find 
that, because arrest of the juveniles was “at least a contingent purpose of the questioning, 
and one of the duties of the security guards was the investigation of criminal activities in the 
park,” the guards were analogous to traditional police officers, mandating the application of 
Miranda).  In Heritage, the park security guards were found to be acting within their official 
capacity as city employees and were “wearing bullet-proof vests under T-shirts bearing gold 
badges with the words ‘Security Officer’ on them.  Although they did not carry firearms, 
each officer also wore a duty belt containing pepper spray, a collapsible baton, handcuffs, a 
radio, and a flashlight holder.”  Id. at 1195. 
 86. In re L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276, 289-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“Appellant was 
isolated and alone during the police interrogation.  This was despite the fact that the shelter, 
through the Department [of Protective and Regulatory Services], had the duty to care for 
and protect appellant.”). 
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tide is turning and schoolhouses are becoming mere extensions of station 
houses, the time is upon us to realistically view school officials in their 
modern capacity as “the authorities,” as fleetingly described in Miranda, 
and provide students the full panoply of Fifth Amendment rights protecting 
against self-incrimination.  While school officials should not be limited 
where questioning centers solely on matters of school discipline, that world 
has seemingly passed us by.  Now, in order to combat the pressures 
inherent in the school setting “and to permit a full opportunity to exercise 
the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and 
effectively appraised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be 
fully honored.”87
 
 
 
 87. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 443. 
